6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

704 ran from just east of Kovel to a point in the Carpathians south of Ternopol'; a key point was the little town of Brody, on the main highway from Rovno to L'vov. Here, in late June, the SS division was put into the line to assist in covering the Galician capital. For three weeks it maintained its position, in the face of fierce Soviet attacks and encircling operations, but by July 20 was no longer effective as a fighting unit. Perhaps 20 percent of its complement fell back with the German armies toward the Carpathians, and half of the remainder escaped to join the UPA or to filter back to the German lines.[29]

661 798 After the victory of Brody, the Red Army rapidly conquered east Galicia, Bukovina, and the Carpatho-Ukraine. By fall, substantially all of the Ukrainian lands were again under the dominion of Moscow. This time the repression exercised by the Communist rulers was harsher and less disguised than it had been five years before. The Greek Catholic Church was attacked ruthlessly. Bishop Slipyi, who had succeeded Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi after the latter's death in late 1944, was arrested and deported to the interior of the Soviet Union. Most of the hierarchy of the Greek Catholic Church, as well as hundreds of its clergy, were likewise banished. Orthodox priests subservient to the Patriarch of Moscow enlisted the aid of a minority of the Greek Catholic clergy, who renounced their allegiance to Rome and joined in constructing a new hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Galicia. The same tactics were pursued in the Carpatho-Ukraine.[30]

[702] 661 According to reports of refugees from the area, very severe measures were taken against the population at large. Men from the ages of eighteen to fifty are said to have been drafted into the Red Army in a mass, without regard for their state of health.[31] Once enlisted, they were said to be watched over by special *politruks*, given inferior arms, and sent into battle after eight

[29] See numerous contributions to *Brody*, and *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA*, for detailed descriptions of military operations of this battle and of the other Ukrainian forces serving with the Wehrmacht.

[30] Cf. Baran, *Mytropolyt*, pp. 137 ff.; Mykola D. Chubatyi, "Russian Church Policy in the Ukraine," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, I (Autumn, 1945), 51–53.

[31] SS war reporter Oleh Lysiak in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 2, 1944, p. 3.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

itself for a few years, very likely a separate Ukrainian hierarchy would have been generally recognized. In the situation which followed from the Bolshevik triumph, neither clear-cut solution was achieved. Instead, a large body of the lower clergy and the faithful split off from the Russian hierarchy in the Ukraine. When no member of the episcopacy could be found to consecrate a new bishop for the dissident group, the Ukrainian church body resorted to the "laying on of hands" by priests as a method for consecrating Father Lypkivs'kyi as prelate of their organization. Thus a new Orthodox Church was formed, which rapidly came to embrace the great majority of organized Orthodox believers in the Ukraine; by 1923 it had no less than three thousand parishes and thirty-five bishops, headed by Lypkivs'kyi, then known as Metropolitan Basil.[1] In spite of this apparent prosperity, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, as it was called, lay under the shadow of two great weaknesses. In the first place, it was not recognized by any other body of the Orthodox Church, for the method of consecration of the new bishops was regarded throughout the Orthodox world as uncanonical, a violation of the essential principle of apostolic succession. From the point of view of the traditional believer, the bishops of the new church were illegitimate; consequently, priests ordained by them (but not those who had joined the Autocephalous Church after ordination by a validly consecrated bishop) were not truly endowed with sacerdotal functions. Secondly, and of more immediate significance, the phenomenal growth of the new church was possible only because of the comparatively indulgent attitude shown by the Communist authorities who, at that time, were more antagonistic to the Russian church than to dissident bodies. When the Soviet power turned to restriction of Ukrainian national activity, as a potential threat to the unity of the USSR, the Autocephalous Church also came under attack. Its entire hierarchy and the great bulk of its clergy were executed or banished in 1929–30.[2]

In view of the close connection between church and state in the Orthodox world, it was only natural that, when the Russian

[1] John S. Reshetar, "Ukrainian Nationalism and the Orthodox Church," *American Slavic and East European Review*, X (February, 1951), 43–45.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

The Polish policy aimed at the disintegration of the national life of the 6 million Ukrainians through attempts to divide them into different 'tribes' which were given various names in official statistics: 'Polishchuk', 'Hutsul', 'Ruthenian', 'Boyko', 'Lemko', and even 'Orthodox' and 'Aborigines'. Against the Orthodox as well as against the Greek Catholic Ukrainians a policy of systematic Polonisation was applied by forcible conversion of the Ukrainians to Roman Catholicism which in the conditions of the Polish State was equivalent to Polonisation. In Ukrainian regions the Poles organised on the eve of World War II 'dragonnades' in order to convert the Greek Orthodox Ukrainians to the Roman Catholic Church: armed Polish gangs drove through the villages, destroyed the Orthodox Churches, beat the Ukrainians, looted their property, and forced them by this terrorism to turn Catholic. Thus the Polish Chauvinists protected by the Polish Government destroyed in 1938 more than 100 Ukrainian Churches, among them many medieval and of great artistic value and forced many Ukrainian communities to accept Roman Catholicism. In vain the Ukrainian deputies to the Polish Diet protested against this Polish violence, in vain the Metropolitan of the Greek Orthodox Church in Poland Dionysios and the Metropolitan of the Greek Catholic Church in Lviw Count Szeptycki rose their voices. The Polish oppression caused a strong opposition and resistance among the Ukrainians in Poland, which the Polish Government tried to suppress by new persecutions. 563 661 798

In the entire Polish policy between the two World Wars the fear of the Ukrainian national movement is undoubtfully apparent. The Polish Government did not wish the creation of an independent Ukraine, fearing that a Ukrainian state would later demand union with the Ukrainian provinces of Poland. Even the small Carpatho-Ukraine, which had proclaimed its autonomy in autumn 1938, seemed dangerous to Poland as giving a 'bad example' for the Ukrainian population in Poland. This was one of the reasons why the Polish Government helped to destroy Czechoslovakia and supported the Hungarian claims on Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939. 000

In September 1939, the Ukrainian territories which after the Treaty of Riga were under Polish rule, were occupied by the Soviet Army in accordance with the German-Russian Pact of August 23, 1939, signed in Moscow. This 'liberation of Western Ukraine' brought to the population of these territories a time of terror and oppression. Thousands of Ukrainians of all classes were deported to the East, many of them did not come back. 661 563

The local Ukrainian Communists also were suspected by the Soviet authorities, they were not admitted to influential positions and were even persecuted as unreliable by nationalists.

Of course, the 656
Ukrainian problem has remained from old times for Soviet Russia 661
the basic problem of its internal and foreign policy. The unceasing
Russification policy against the Ukrainians is carried on by par- [191]
ticularly cunning methods: the Ukrainian language is not yet
abolished definitely in the offices of Soviet Ukraine. But that official who speaks Ukrainian also in his family and in private relations becomes in the eyes of the Soviet authorities suspicious, and has to suffer repressions.

The Communist theory of the national problem worked out by Lenin preaches the 'fusion of nations'. Basing on this, the Russian Communist Government is trying to 'fuse' the nations of the Soviet Union with the Russians. Against peoples who oppose forced Russification, ruthless repressions are used by Moscow. Even the mentioning of the national rights of the non-Russian peoples is condemned in the USSR as 'bourgeois nationalism'.

There is a great principal difference between the situation of the 000
Russians and the peoples united by force with this state: though the Russians are not satisfied with the Communist dictatorship, they do not, however, feel national oppression. Even in the new anthem of the USSR it is said that this state was rallied by Great Russia. We can state the efforts of Russian political groups opposing the Communist régime to maintain the rule of the Russian state over the territories conquered by Soviet Russia, even after the eventual fall of the Soviet régime.

As a curious fact we can quote the view of the well-known Communist L. Trotzky, who was assassinated in Mexico during World War II, on the Ukrainian problem. Trotzky demanded in 1939 the full separation of Ukraine from Russia. But Trotzky thought of an independent Ukraine in the form of a Soviet Republic. This naturally deprived his thesis of all seriousness, for Trotzky needed the slogan of an independent Ukraine only as a political argument in polemics against Stalin (*Bulletin of the Opposition*, No. 77/78, 1939).

As the facts prove, the Ukrainian nation has to endure the heaviest oppression in the USSR. Unfortunately, the words of the famous historian of France Charles Seignobos written in 1913 on Ukraine, can be used emphatically to describe the outstanding feature of the present state of the Ukrainian nation: "Here is the most oppressed nation" ("Voici la nation la plus opprimée", *Les Annales des Nationalités:* Paris, 1913).

In its equalising policy, the Soviet Russian Government retains, 659
also, traces of the Tsarist régime in the affairs of Church and reli- 798
gion. Thus, after having seized Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine dur- 661

ing World War II, the Soviet Government abolished the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church by force, against the will of the population, and destroyed the hierarchy of this Church. The Ukrainian Greek Catholics who were in union with Rome were ordered to become subordinate to the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow, who is backed by the Soviet Government.

The struggle of the Ukrainians against Russian imperialism did not cease after World War II. It is being conducted in various forms. In this struggle other peoples who are oppressed by Russia, from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Turkestan, participate. Thus a common front of freedom-loving peoples against despotic Russia is being created.

In 1949, Moscow has permitted Ukraine to use an own flag and an own different anthem. However, this cannot be regarded an extension of the rights of Ukraine in the Soviet Union. It seems to be more an attempt to bring the so-called satellite countries to the Ukrainian level.

Moscow is watching attentively every expression of Ukrainian political thought and national sentiment, and wants to have everything under its control. The Decade of Ukrainian Culture held in Moscow in July 1951, ended with rebukes and threats against the participants of the Decade, and a 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists whom Moscow imputes 'bourgeois nationalism'. Only the Russian Communists have beeen beyond any doubt as regards their 'internationalism'; there was no case that the manifestations of nationalism among the Russian Communists had been condemned by the Communist Party. On the contrary, Moscow is cultivating an exaggerated national pride among the Russian people. The Ukrainian Communists are under a especially heavy control of [554] Moscow. No Ukrainian has been General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. This position has always been occupied by people sent from Moscow: Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, Khrushchev, finally Melnikov.

'Titoism' is no isolated phenomenon in the relations between imperialist Russia and Yugoslavia. Similar trends hostile to Russian imperialism have existed among Ukrainian Communists since the first days of Soviet Russian occupation in Ukraine. The Russian terrorism prevented these trends, however, from getting strong. Nevertheless, they exist clandestinely. Moscow's persecution of 'burgeois nationalism' among the Ukrainian Communists gives an eloquent proof of Ukrainian opposition against Russian imperalism.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

led by Prince Constantine Ostrogski and the Cossacks, and on the other hand from the Polish Catholic bishops, who did not wish to recognize the Uniat bishops as their equals in rights. On the demand of the Orthodox part of the Ukraine, the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, Theophanus, ordained new bishops for the Ukraine to take the place of those who had joined the Uniat Church. At first these were not accepted by the Polish kings; but, under the pressure of Cossack demands, Ladislaus IV divided the bishoprics of the Ukraine between the Uniats and the Orthodox. The Orthodox bishops were installed in Przemysl, Lvov, and Lutsk. In their opposition to the Uniat Church, the Cossacks united with the Russians.

At the Polish Partition of 1795, all the sees were Uniat except Lvov and Przemysl, and there were about 12,000,000 professing Uniats. In spite of the fact that all treaties between Poland and Russia (1773, 1775, 1788, 1793, 1795) had expressly guaranteed the toleration of Catholics of both rites, the persecution of Uniats by Russia began almost at once. In 1827 the four Uniat bishoprics of Vilna, Brest, Polotsk, and Lutsk were made into two, the Lithuanian and White Russian. In 1833 forcible conversion was introduced; and in 1839 a sham petition was addressed to the Russian Government by a Uniat priest, Joseph Siemaszko, asking that the Uniat Church should be restored to communion with the State religion. Wholesale massacres and banishments to Siberia began; the last Uniat Bishop of Cholm, Kalinski, was exiled, and a Galician apostate, Popiel, was installed in his place. In 1875 the Union was officially suppressed.

The attitude of the Poles to the Union was changed after the Polish Partitions. The Catholic clergy and people in Russian Poland supported the Uniats in their refusal to attend the Orthodox Church; the Uniats were officially known as 'non-Christians', though unofficially their spiritual needs were attended to by the Uniat or Catholic clergy. The Uniat Church in Galicia supported their countrymen across the

frontier. After the proclamation of religious toleration in 1905, about 200,000 Ukrainians immediately declared themselves Uniats, so that the Russian Government soon found it necessary to restrict the scope of the proclamation. Though the Uniats in Russia were forbidden to join the Catholic Church, many of them became Catholics or sectaries. The last Russian persecution of the Uniat Church took place during the Russian occupation of Galicia in 1915, when the Russian bishop, Eulogius, started a regular campaign to replace Uniat priests by Orthodox clergy, and Uniat Ukrainian by Russian Orthodox schools. Many Uniat priests were banished to Siberia; and the Uniat Metropolitan, Szeptycki, was exiled to a Russian monastic prison. It is uncertain whether the Uniat Church has been gaining ground outside the provinces of Chołm and Polesia. As no statistics have been taken in Russia since the decree of religious toleration in 1905, it is difficult to give a correct estimate of the number of members of the Russian Orthodox Church, but their percentage varies from 75 to 93 in the various Governments of the Russian Ukraine. The Great-Russian sect of the *Raskolniki* (Old Believers) found refuge in the Governments of Kharkov (0·1 per cent. of the population) and Chernigov (0·9 per cent.).

The number of Roman Catholics, chiefly Poles, is higher in the west (in Volhynia the Poles in 1897 formed 6·16 per cent. of the population), but they are only slightly more numerous than the Lutheran Protestants (in Volhynia 5·73 of the population), who are German colonists.

Of great social importance are the peasant sects, of which the chief in the Ukraine is the *Shtunda* (from *Stunde*, since they gather at a definite hour). The doctrines of this Lutheran sect, which originated in Württemberg in 1705, were brought to South Russia by the Württemberg merchants, as the Danzig merchants, who came here after the partitions of Poland, brought with them the teaching of the Mennonite sect. Since 1870 it has been oppressed officially by the Russian

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

795 Government. The centres of the Shtundists are in the
798 Kherson Government (the districts of Yelisavetgrad and Odessa), in the Kiev Government (the districts of Tarashchansk, Skirsk, and Zvenigorodsk), in the Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov, and Poltava Governments, and to a less extent in Chernigov, Podolia, and Bessarabia. In their boycott of official churches, ikons, and priests, of military service, and to a great extent of the Government itself, the Shtundists are akin to other sectaries. One branch of Ukrainian sectaries combines the teaching of the Shtundists and that of the Baptists, and are called Neo-Baptists. The sectaries in the Ukraine, as elsewhere, were suppressed by the Russian Government, but those who have studied the question (e.g. Prugavin[1]) state that they number more than 20,000,000.

793 *Position of the Clergy.*—On the whole it is true that the Uniat clergy in Eastern Galicia, Cholm, Polesia, and wherever the Uniat Church is found, as well as the leaders of the sects in the other parts of the Ukraine, exercise enormous influence over religious and social
554 life. The persecutions they have undergone have strengthened their prestige among the peasants and even among the *intelligentsia*. The influence of the Russian Orthodox clergy, though many of them have been of Ukrainian nationality, has been limited to the religious sphere, since socially they have been generally regarded as Government officials by the peasants and still more by the *intelligentsia*.

The clergy in the Ukraine are on the whole less educated than in Great Russia, i. e. they are mostly 'seminarists', not 'academicians'. The Kievo-Pecherskaya Lavra, once known for its learning, has degenerated into a monastery in which some of the monks are illiterate. For the last twenty-five years the highest positions all over the Empire have been in the hands of the monastic clergy; and there was acute hostility between them and the secular clergy, who in

[1] See V. Anderson, *Old Believers and Sectaries*, Petrograd, 1908 (Russ.): also T. I. Buthevich, *Survey of Russian Sects and their Creeds*, Kharkov, 1910 (Russ.).

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the Ukraine were mostly of the 'seminarist' type and often of Ukrainian nationality, and hence of peasant descent. In the Ukraine the secular clergy were, if anything, more popular than the monastic.

(*b*) *Jews.*—Next in number to the Orthodox are the Jews. Records make it clear that since the seventeenth century the Ukraine has been the centre of the Jewish 'pogrom' movement, and is more anti-Semitic than any other East-European country. A Hebrew-Jewish scholar, Nathan of Zaslavl, has left a document[1] containing the record of terrible atrocities perpetrated by the Ukrainians and Cossacks on the Jews during the Cossacks' War against Poland. The 'pogroms' of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries may appear less cruel; but, though they were organized by the Russian secret police, it has been proved in the law-courts that the local population was quite ready to fall in with the suggestions of these agents.[2] The reasons for this hatred are partly economic—for the Jews are very successful middlemen between the Ukraine and other countries, and hence in possession of capital, which they lend at a high rate to the peasant—but are also racial, since the hatred between these two races is stronger than that between either Poles or Great Russians and the Jews. All the traditions of the steppe-country peasant are opposed to those of the Jewish townsman. This is shown by the facts that there is hardly any mixed Jewish-Ukrainian population, and that the Jews live chiefly in the towns and industrial settlements where Russians and Poles predominate. The Jews came to the Ukraine on the first wave of colonization from Poland in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

According to data obtained in 1897, the percentage of the Jewish population in the Governments of the Ukraine was as follows: Volhynia, 13·2 per cent.; Podolia, 12·24 per cent.; Kiev, 12·09 per cent.; Kherson, 12 per cent.; Chernigov, 5 per cent.;

[1] *Jawein Mesula: a Chronicle of Events from 1648 to 1652.* First printed in Vienna, 1656.

[2] I. Luchitski, *Legal Speeches concerning the Jewish Pogroms*, Kiev, 1908 (in Russian).

517 156 E14 Kiyev, Khar'kov and Odessa are the most important centers of East Ukrainian intellectual life. It is there that most of the Ukrainian books, periodicals and newspapers are published. Besides that, the Ukrainian tongue is also printed in many smaller cities. Many of the Soviet Ukrainian authors glorify present conditions; these are the interpreters of Communism, the worshipers of machines and idols. But there are also others, like Khvylovy, who in truthful pamphlets derided the state of affairs, the proletarian wirepullers, their ingenuousness, their venality and their eagerness to work their way up, authors who write with a nationalistic purpose, who are "exposed" and then, like Khvylovy, come to an unfortunate end. "Experts maintain that even in the works of the Ukrainian Communist writers, especially the younger ones, the national feeling cannot be hidden, that an inner schism appears in their works. They do not actually belong to proletarian literature which has remained inwardly foreign to them. How could it be otherwise with such a past!" (56) /Facing page 104/

56. Zalozieckyj, ibid.

439 /Map VIII: Grain Export from the Soviet Ukraine and North Caucasus (Average for 1927/1928) This map differentiates between actual Soviet Ukraine and the North Caucasus regions. Export to foreign countries is insignificant compared to supplies sent to the Greater Russian areas of the Soviet Union situated in the forest belt./ /Key: Grain: ● from Soviet Ukraine, ● from the North Caucasus./

/105/ Trapping Souls

•798 On Sunday, May 29, 1939 a unique event took place in the church of St. Peter in Rome:

•798 at the papal altar under the mighty canopy the former Imperial Russian diplomat at the court of the sultan and at present Byzantine-Slavic suffragan Monsignor Yevreyinov celebrated a solemn high mass in the Byzantine-Slavic ritual. Pius XII, the cardinals of the Vatican, the Collegium Ruthenum and the Collegium Russorum devoutly attended, and the casual churchgoers marveled at the strange choirs in the ancient Slavic tongue. The Pope ordered this high mass in honor of the same Vladimir the Great and Most Holy who approximately 950 years before had refused to receive the legates of his predecessors on the throne of Peter and who had been baptized in Byzantium.

A new attempt, therefore, to unite the East Roman Church with the West Roman one, a distinct gesture to the 180 million souls of Orthodox Christianity who are to be won over! The goal was often in sight, but again and again reintegration failed. The attempts of the Vatican to convert East Rome, or at least some of its believers, are as old as the separation of the two churches itself. Even the legates who had deposited the papal bulls of excommunication in the Hagia Sophia in Constantinople had returned to Rome via Kiyev. The efforts at reconciliation were never completely given up. In 1418 at the Council of Constance it was the metropolitan of Kiyev who had offered the submission of his followers on condition that the retention of the Slavic liturgy and /106/ ritual be granted. His offer was rejected. Twenty years later many bishops of the East and West Roman Church put their signatures to the solemn reconciliation which was then confirmed in the bull "Laetantur coeli". But this union also failed as a result of the opposition of the Muscovite Grand-Prince Vassily the Blind and the Orthodox believers. Toward the end of the same century the Orthodox Church was close to complete dissolution. Its

•798 collapse seemed inevitable when in 1595 seven Orthodox bishops had approved the Brest Union in principle. But Polish-Jesuit intolerance, unfulfilled promises and disregard of the rights of those who were ready to enter the union made some of the bishops mistrustful and again estranged them. The arrogance with which the Catholic party treated the Orthodox, their public mockery, indeed even maltreatment of the Orthodox priests at that time, caused a chasm so great that to this day it has not been bridged over. At the same time, those who were already Uniats were not much better off. Their "complete equality" with Polish citizens and the Catholic clergy remained an empty promise which it was not in the power of the Uniat bishops to enforce. If the lower priests did not belong to the nobility "they were often seen in torn clothing walking along, whip in hand, beside their horses and oxen, furnishing relays for the state or performing compulsory services as serfs to their master." (57)

57. The Ukraine and the Church Union, page 24.

Conditions in the Uniat church improved in those regions that had come under Austrian rule after the partitioning of Poland, whereas in congressional Poland a ukase of the Czar again forcefully opened up the Orthodox heaven to the Uniats. With Peter the Great, who in 1721 had transferred the rights of the patriarchy of Moscow to the Holy Synod, the Czar had become the head of the Orthodox Church.

184 795 Since the serious crisis of Orthodoxy in the 15th and 16th /107/ century, the opportunity for a reunion of both churches* has never been as favorable as it is at present. The "defender of all Orthodox believers" is dead. The Synod in Moscow as well as the Ukrainian church, which

*[i.e., Catholic-orthodox - Analyst]

Vatican.

000 Many hundreds of Catholic priests trained in the Orthodox ritual are waiting for the moment when the frontiers of the Soviet Union will be opened to the missionaries of Rome. /108/ They have been educated in the numerous special seminaries for priests which were erected at the wish of Pius XI in many dioceses of various countries.

First of all, however, the Orthodox of Poland were to be converted, of which, according to the last census, there were 3.8 million. The overwhelming majority of them were Greek Orthodox after the Brest Union and before their adoption into the Russian Empire. Now they were to be united anew with the Roman-Catholic Church, not all at once, by force or from above through the conversion of bishops, but gradually and from below by winning over laymen and the priests. Pius XI who was for many years nuncio in Warsaw and got along well with the Poles, used for this purpose a more recent ritual, the Byzantine-Slavic one, which is more nearly like the purely Orthodox than is the Greek Orthodox, known as Ruthenian in Rome. Externally the Byzantine-Slavic priests 795 • 798 with their long beards, their long hair and the klobuk (priest's hat) resemble their Orthodox colleagues. The dogma of this evolving church has not been definitively established. The Roman ecclesiastical congregation of the East is still uncertainly feeling its way along this difficult terrain. The orthodox love the form and even more the profound mysticism of their service which is rich in symbolism. The Vatican has learned from previous mistakes; it does not want to be hasty and arouse distrust. It is necessary to tread softly in places where the figures of saints are shunned as idols and demons and where the pope is regarded as the personified Antichrist. The fathers of the Byzantine-Slavic ritual are open to reason in matters of dogma, but the pope must

be recognized as the supreme shepherd and as infallible in ecclesiastical matters. This is their first condition. The dogma grows shaky on the doctrine about purgatory. The Orthodox Church knows only heaven and hell; and it is not always easy - in spite of the comforting prospect - to convince laymen and priests who are willing to be converted that there is also a purgatory./109/ The question as to whether the new ritual could not get along without this place of purification is at present still being considered in Rome. The problem of the origin of the Holy Spirit who, according to the Roman-Catholic conception forms a unity with God the Father and the Son, and according to the Orthodox belief originates only in God the Father, causes the least difficulties. The Byzantine-Slavic ritual is here permitted to adopt the Orthodox dogma.

Even though the 2000-year-old Roman Church had time carefully to prepare the matter of union, this was not the case with the fast-moving Polish state. Since Misika, a contemporary of Vladimir, introduced West Roman Christianity into Poland, the latter has always been at a disadvantage in its battle over the countries of the Slavic peoples with Orthodox religion, and it has always tried to compensate for this defect by Catholisizing in a headlong fashion. Polish missionary methods have done more harm than good as far as the Vatican is concerned. More than once the Papal See was obliged to curb Polish nationalism; four papal decress forbid the conversion of members of the Union to the Roman Catholic faith. In spite of this the Poles blithely went on "converting".

The most recent attempts at union by Pius XI and Pius XII were from the beginning sorely impeded by the preference shown the Poles by the deceased pope. Pius XI who gave Byzantine-Slavic ritual a new impulse excluded the Greek-Catholic clergy of Galicia, that is to say the Ukrainian priests, from their work of converting their

brothers in Volhynia, in Lublin, in Polesia and in Podlakhia. He placed the clergy of the growing church under the jurisdiction of Polish Roman-Catholic bishops. Instead of Ukrainian priests, the French, Dutch and Poles, Redemptorists, Jesuits and Polish secular priests began missionary work in the Ukraine. It was supervised by an apostolic inspector who could pronounce no ecclesiastical judgment. The seminary for priests in Dubno was directed by Jesuits. /110/ But the thing that embittered all Ukrainians, whether Orthodox or Uniat, most of all against Rome, was the way the Orthodox Ukrainian ecclesiastical possessions seized by Warsaw were wasted on the Poles. The long fight between Ukrainian and Polish clergy about this property was settled by Pius XI in favor of the weaker party. Polish pastors received Ukrainian prebends and Polish colonists 100,000 hectares of land. The metropolitan of Lwów in a pastoral letter which was confiscated, described the papal procedure with regard to Poland as "robbery".

It cannot be denied that the Poles carried on a clever ecclesiastical policy toward the Vatican. Their strongest pressure instrument was probably the autocephalous Polish Church with Russian hierarchy which was subject to the Byzantine patriarch. A separate Orthodox faculty had been provided for it at the Warsaw University. In this way the Papal See could be threatened and its plans thwarted without incurring punishment.

The violent Catholisizing actions of the Poles, known as the "revindication of souls" made the Roman efforts at union extremely difficult. In the process of Polonizing Orthodox Ukrainians, the churches were often the only obstacle that needed to be taken seriously, for where the cultured stratum of society was so thin, the pope and the church were the only national prop the people had.

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778 The removal of this national stronghold has been systematically carried on for many years by the Poles through methods which could probably be compared with those of the "revindication" of Catherine II.

As early as 1928 the Warsaw government closed approximately 400 Orthodox churches and liquidated the church property belonging to them. The "Ukrainian Self Reliance League of Canada" in a petition to the League of Nations asserted that by closing the Orthodox churches or by transferring them to the Roman Catholic Church "the members of the Greek Orthodox Church are deprived of the right of free /111/ exercise of their religion". The Poles dropped the last controls in the summer of 1938. They banished the few Ukrainian intellectuals from the border region; mounted corps of frontier guards with army chaplains at their head entered the Orthodox villages and a few hours later left the communities which had now become "converted" to Rome. Finally, Warsaw also carried on its missionary work with powder and quickmatch. About this the confiscated "Kuryer Wilenski" of August 26, 1938 reports among other things: "The destruction in the past month of a hundred and more Orthodox churches in the eastern districts of the voivodeship of Lublin at the command of the administrative bodies produced, as we know, first a reaction on the part of the bishop's council of the Orthodox Church in Poland and then also a reaction of the head of the Greek Uniat Church in the form of a manifesto to all believers, as well as incitement of the population in a few towns in which these 'riots' occurred... The Greek Orthodox clergy maintains that in the voivodeship of Lublin 114 Orthodox churches were destroyed by order of the authorities... It cannot be denied that people of the Greek Orthodox faith were profoundly stirred by the fact that their sanctuaries were destroyed."

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This is a picture of the beginning of the new Union.

/112/ Moscow Educates

000 In one thing Lenin proved superior to his enemies and predecessors: he knew how to utilize the social-revolutionary and nationalist-revolutionary forces in the vast Russian Empire for his own ends. With the explosive material which Hetman Skoropadskyj and the counterrevolutionary general Denikin had piled up anew through their forcible restoration of large estates, he destroyed both opponents. He met the collapse of the idea of a Pan-Russian Empire with the slogan of the revolutionary proletarian unified front of non-Russian peoples of the former czarist realm against the capitalist states. It was only for appearances' sake that he complied with the national wishes of the peoples gathered together under Moscow.

668 In Russian Ukraine, where at the beginning of the Revolution the national consciousness of the great masses of peasants was not yet deeply rooted, Lenin's tactics did not run against insuperable difficulties. The cultured stratum, already not too large, was divided into two camps, one of which sympathized with Bolshevism, while the other regarded an autonomy within the democratic realm of Great Russia as the most favorable solution of the problem of nationalities. Thus from the beginning Lenin had a part of the Ukrainian people on his side, and he subjugated the rest with the help of Muscovite troops during years of bloody civil wars. True, in November 1917, in the "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia" sovereign rights "including the right of severance and of formation of an independent state" /113/ were promised, but toward the end of the period of the Communist war there was no force left which might have made use of it.